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I. iIntroduct.$gn
Porast resources in the Philippines have been utilized over the
years with the traditional view that they are inexhaustible. Although
of great importance for their protection of watersheds and other
environmental values, attention has been centered on tlgerproducts,
especially logss lumber, plywood and veneer.
The Importance of these timber products arises from their
contribution to the national product and their substantial foreign
exchange earnings. For the last 30 years they havebeen among the
countryVs top ten dollar earners; and their c0mblnedoutput constitutes
about five per cent of the natlon_s net domestic product.
The Phillpplnest llke most developing countries, presently faces
a dlfflcult external environment, with high o11 prices and slow growth
in world trade and capltal flows, which challenges the country to find
additional efficient means of earning or savlng forelgn exchange. Thus,
the government l_ks to the forelgn trade sector for promoting economic
efficiency and growth, as well as for attracting foreign capital. In
forestry, the focus:is.on the promotion of domestic processing of wood,
together_Ith reforestation and forest protection, as means of enhancing
e
the sector's long-run capaclty to earn and save foreign exchange.
-- 2--
The production of forest 8oods and services entails the use not only
of forest land and trees, but also Of labor, capital and management. The
forestry sector competes with other sectors in its use of these
resources. _ It is important, therefore, to assess its efficiency in
resource use. The efficiency of an economic activity can be measured by the
social opportunity cost Of the resources used to achieve a 8iven
objective of the activity. The domestic resource cost of earning or
saving, foreign exchanKe (DRC) represents •such a measure; and, as Bautiata
(1979) has pointed out, it is particularly relevant for tradable goods
in a small, open economy where foreign trade policy distortions exist and
foreign exchanse is deemed scarce. The DRC measure represents, in effect,
the rate at which domestic resources, measured in pesos of opportunity
cost can be converted into foreign 'exchanse throush a particular economic
ectlvity. Comparative advantage for that activity is indicated if the
DEC is less than the shadov price of foreign exchanKe.
In addition to judging the relative efficiency Of forest sector
activities, it is important to assess the impact of government policies
on these activities. For it is possible through price intervention and
other policies to transform a socially advantageous activity into a pri-
vately unattractive one, and vice versa. In this connection we must
• . .. . ' ..
assess:the effects not only of government policies specific to .the
forestry sector (e.g,..export tax or export ban on loss) but also the.
powerful and pervasive effects • of the tariff system and exchange rate
,.. '.. ,
pOliCy on tradable forest products. In many instances these can tramp
the affects of sector specific policies.
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Accordingly, this study aims to: (1) assess the co.pare,lye, advan-
tage of the Philippines in producing major forest products such as logs,
lumber and plywood, using the DRC criterion; (2) quantify the protactio:
or penalty conferred on these activities by government policies; and
(3) draw policy iiplications from the elpirical results and suuest
policy measures that might help to improve the efficiency o£ allocation
of resources to and within the forestry sector.
2. Policies and Performance
Philippine forest resources are managed jointly by public and private
interests. The exploitation of the forests; which are publicly owned,
are delegated to private enterprises through a licensing system which
allows for a S0-year maximum tenure, including renewals. In 1979 the
total land area under license was 8.26 million hecearee, which is about
26 per cent of the country's total land area.
" The licensees manage their forest concessions under the supervision
and regulations of the government; and pay cutting charges based on the
volume of timber removed. Nominally, management is based on the prin-
ciples of sustained yield and selective logging. In practice, however,
overcutting and failure to implement the 'ltinber stand improvement phase"
of selective louin 8 have led to the diminution of the forests (Revilla,
1979). It has been estimated that during the 1970s the annual rate of
forest loss night have been as hlgh as 200,000 hectares (Sesura-de los
Angeles, 1981).
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The consequences of years of sub-optimal forest management include
land erosion, increasing frequency of floods, clogging of irrigation systems,
and decreasing productivity of croplands, To reverse this process, Revilla
(1980) has argued that land in productive forest could almost double over 40 years,
mainly through the conversion of unproductive grasslands and brush. In
his view this would not be at the expense of agriculture, but indeed
would provide net benefits to crop production through renewing and
extending watersheds.
There appears to be general agreement on a number of reasons for
the inadeq-scy of forest management (Segura-de los Angeles, 1981):
inadequate &ovemment supervision , biased and incomplete land classifi-
cation, too short a lease term (plus cancellation of l_censes as a penalty
for violations in lieu of finn enforcement of regulations), short run
costs of implementlng selective logging combined with high interest rates,
uneconomically small~sized concessions, and low cutting charges.
In any case, the implication is that the production of for_t pro-
ducts has not been accomplished by the most efficient or socially
desiEable methods. This presents us with s problem in assessing the
Philippines' comparative advantage in the production of logs, lumber and
plywood. Considerin& the external social costs associated with past
practices, one m/ght readily conclude that production of those products
with those methods is not comparatively advantageous.
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That is, foreign exchange earnlng and saving in the forest product
industry has been achieved at far too high a cost in degradation of the
environment. This is a judgement that we cannot back with quantitative
measures. •Rather it reflects what appears to be a general consensus
among government and private experts;
Should we then conolude that the Philippines does not have a comparative
advantage in forest products? The implication would be that resources
should be taken out of forestry and transferred to other more comparatively
advantageous activities. The prlncipalresource, of course, is land; but
to take land out of trees and devote it to other crops would only make
matters worse.
Alternatively, the implication might be simply that logging should
be halted completely. This, however, views the economic activity of
forestry as simply the harvesting Of trees, with no consideration for
replanting and ot_er aspects of sustained yield forestry. Past practices
have, perhaps, bordered on "mining' I the forests; and, as noted above,
there seems to be a general consensus this_not economically advantageous.that
In our approach to assessing comparative advantage in •forest products
by estimating domestic resource costs of foreign exchange,• we have made the
heroicassumptlonthat the government will in future be able to supervise
and enforce reasonably well a sustained yleld management of the forests.
This means that we are assessing the potential comparative advantage of
.sustained yield forest activities. We return to this in the section on
methodology below. •
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Policies. Comparative advantage depends on relative social costs and
benefits, but actual performance of an industry depends on private costs
and gains, including the effects of government policies on these. The prln-
c/pal policies, in addition to the licensing and supervision of forest
management, are the cutting charges, export taxes, and the export quota
on logs.
Forest Charges. These are considered to be the selling price of
tlmberto the licensees. Before 1981, they consisted of the regular
forest charges and other charges imposed to finance various activities
such as reforestation, extension services, research and forest protec-
ion. In 1981 these were consolidated into fees of _30/m 3 and FlS/m 3,
respectively, for two broad species group. While these represent a sub-
stantial increase, the trend of forest charges as ad valorem rates has,
nonetheless, been steadily down since the 1950s.-Even the higher of the
two rates represents only about 4.4 per cent of the wholesale price of
logs in 1981, as compared to an average of 6_3 per cent in 1956-59_.*
Prior to the consolldatlonand increase in 1981, the average ad valorem
rate had fallen to less than two per cent.
*By 1983 forest charges were between five and slxper cent Of log
value, owing to the lower prices of logs.
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Total revenues from forest charges remained level over the 1970s
while 8overnment expenditures on £orestry increased substantially after
1974, as can be seen in Table I. In the first half of the decade
expenditures and revenues roughly matched, while the former rose to
almost slx times the latter by 1979. Even the 1981 increase in rates
will leave revenues far short of expenditures. These revenues do not.
however, include those from export taxes, as well as sales_ property
and income taxes.
Export Taxes. Export taxes were imposed in 1970 on wood products,
along with other major exports, as a stabillzstlon measure accompanying
the devaluatlon of the peso. The rate on logs was 10 per cent, double
the rate on lumber_ plywood and veneer. During the boom in world commo-
dity prices in the mid-1970s, a premium duty was temporarily added to
the export tax. While the original intention was to phase out over
several years export taxes on all products, they were instead retained,
•pres,-..bly for their capacity to generate revenue. The present rates
are 20 per cent for logs, four per cent for lumber and veneer_ and zero
for plywood.
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The Export Quota. The policy on log export ban arose mainly from
a desire to encourage wood processlngt as well as to reduce the rate of
forest destruction. On May 19, 1975, PD 705 was issued providing for a
total log export ban effective January It 1976. Opposltlon to the ban
has been aired owing to the importance of the foreign exchange earnings
from log exports and the alleged unreadiness of the processing plants
which were mostly of less than economic size. In addition it was pre-
dlcted that the domestic market would not be able to absorb the pro-
cessed products which the foreign market could not take due to its
sluggish condition. Hence, PD 865 was issued to suspend the ban and
allow log exportation on a selective and limited basis. On June 11,
1979' FD 1159 was implemented allowlng for a total log export not exceed-
ing 25 per cent of the total allowable cut. Finally, on May It 1982,
a complete ban was to have taken effect.
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Table 1. Goverument Forestry Revenues and Expenditures
1970-I979
(in _000 at current prices)
ExpendituresI Revenues 2
1970 66,514 67,247
1971 51,668 72,486
1972 61,105 65,780
1973 71,373 91,489
1974 65,314 115,639
1975 105,838 95,835
1976 235,536 100,770
1977 215,139 75,259
1978 270,625 73,119
1979 (est.) 356,903 61,548
1980 (est.) 394,501
I
Principally by the Bureau of Forest Development. 1970-1975 are
f£scal years, while 197.6-1979are calendar years.
2
Principally from forest charges and inspection fees. (Fiscal years)
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The quota limitations have not at all been effective as is evidenced
by the trade data from impozting countries. • Table 2 illustrates this
with data from Japan for1977-80, during which Japan took about 75 per
cent of Philippine log exports.
JL,,
Table 2
Hardwood Log Exports to Japan, 1977-80
Year Quantlty (i_000 cu. met.) Value (i,000 us $)
Phil. data Japan data Phil. data Japan data
(I) (2) (1)/(2) (3) (4) (3)/(4)
1977 1,522,112 1,614,488 .943 124,455 138,131 .901
1978 1,616,047 1,754,952 .921 131,993 158,579 .832
1979 985,450 1,342,741 .734 132,130 206,812 .639
1980 502,458 1,119,451 .449 78,105 203,962 .383
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While the reporting of Philippine exports was reasonably close to
Japan's reporting of imports in !977 and 1978, the discrepancy increased
greatly in the next two years when quotas were sharply reduced.
Growth and exports. While the continuing importance in terms of
output and foreign exchange earnings, forest products-have not contri-
buted slgnificantlyto the overall growth of the economy. While GNP
tripled over the past two decades, output of the major wood products
increased by only one-third. Total exports (in 1972 prices) were 3.5
tlmesln 1980 what they were in 1960, while exports of wood products
declined in physical volume by one-thlrd over the same period. In value
terms (U.S. dollars) wood products declined as a share of total exports
from almost 20 per cent to eight per cent. Even if we could correct for
the substantial under-reportlng of log production and export in 1980,
the image of forest products as a stagnant sector in the Philippine eco-
nomy would remain.
This, of course, is not surprising, given the competing demands for
scarce land that accompany rapid population growth. Even with ideal forest
management, we could hardly expect forest output to keep up with overall
economic growth. Actual management practices, have, of course, led to a
shrinking of the forest resource base. It should be noted, however, that
output of agricultural crops almost tripled over the same two decades, owing
to substantial increases in yields.
What elements of dynamism and growth have been present are found in
the processing of logs. This is revealed in Table 3where the production
and export of logs, lumber and plywood/veneer are shown for 1959-80. The
growth of output and exports of the processedproducts stand Insharp
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Table.4. Historical prices of log, lumber and plywood, 1955 : 1980.
: PRICE OF LOGS--1/ (_ ./m 3 ): PRICE OF LLI_BER(_ [. I_.P): PRXCEO1' PLX'WOOD(_II_S!
.L_esa__/: : Wholesaler_.; Export . Wholesale=..
,
1955 54 45 205 213 680
1956 67 41 228 226 680 484
1957 63 40 217 253 670 484
1958 60 40 186 183 610 409
1959 64 43 186 251 700 - = "
1960 77 50 186 123 600 '771
1961 89 -- 241 --- 570 682
1962 88 -- 240 432 780 ---
1963 97 1_)" 258 --- 800 !014
1964 102 98 286 413 800 1059
1965 102- 85 290 515 980 20
1966 102 93 297 571 980 780
1967 111 99 232 557 980 820
1968 126 86 359 547 980 900
1969 131 99 370 567 I010 1010
1970 150 150 404 697 1180 1420
1971 188 165 487 778 1260 1160
1972 199 157 522 958 1200 !230
1973 251 270 611 ,' 1434 1820 _820
1974 354 311 917 1678 2624 2500
1975 304 267 793 1825 3120 2180
1976 347 441 I091 2362 3270 2830
1977. 430 490 1.550 1550 -24_6, 3108
1978 456 490 1645 2363 2540 3390
1979 550 946 1986 3411 5705' 4720
1980 676 990 2728 4022 6355 3610
Price of white lauan logs
Wholesale price ex-Manila
_/ Export price is FOB converted into pesos by multiplying by the
official exchange rate.
Sources: Central Bank
Bureau of Forest Development. 1976 & 1980. Phil; ForesC._y
Statistics
PREPF Technical Paper Nos. 3:4,5
World Bank. 1980. Price prospects for Ma$or Primary Co_noditles.
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contrast to the picture for logs, Still the growth of lumber output fell
far short of overall GNP growth, while output of plywood and veneer grew
at a pace only slightly ahead of GNP. Moreover, this growth occurred
mainly in the 1960s and early 1970s. The latter half of the 1970s is
characterized by stagnation in wood processing, accompanying a decline
in log production.
Again, we must be cautious in interpreting these figures because of
the likelihood of substantial under-reporting of log exports and pro-
duction. The table nonetheless suggests a sharp increase in lumber
exports together with a decline in log exports at the end of the decade
as lo8 export quotas tightened, Since output of lumber declined after
1978, this represented a diversion to the export market in response to
sharp increases in the export price in 197g and 1980 (see Table 4),
3. Economic Analysis of Forestry Policies
The whole set of government policies affecting forestry represents
a broad and complex system of controls, regulations and price interven-
tions. Here the focus is on price intervention policies; and a number
of simplifying assumptions are made.
The pollcy instruments considered are (1) direct controls and regu-
latlons on logglng concessions, (2) cutting charges, (3) export tax,
(4) export quota, (5) export subsidy on processed wood products, (6) forest
land rent, and (7) sales tax.
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The first aim of the government is to conserve forest for multi-
purpose uses-- e.g., as watershed. To this end, the government limits
the area of logging concessions and sets rules and regulations regarding
their use.
In addition, we set a number of other aims for government with
respect to the forestry industry. Fist, it should aim to capture for
society and economic rents* from logging conces%ions, since it is society
who owns the forest. There are other income d_stribution goals to consider;
but this is the only one considered here. An especially serious omission
in this regard is the question of the livelihood of the people in the forest
communities and their access to forest resources. This is a major issue
which warrants separate study. Second, the government should aim to promote
foreign exchange earnings from forest products to the extent that this is
consistent with the principle of comparative advantage. Third, it should
raise revenue for forest administration. In sum, the goals of the government
with respect to forestry policies are assumed to relate to conservation, income
distribution, foreign exchange earnings and revenue raising.
Associated with conservation are multiple goals and the analysis of
effects of policies could be very complex and difficult to quantify. The basic
assumption made here is that the government had decided to limit and regulate
log production in order to conserve or augment the area of forest land. If it
were simply a quantitative question, price intervention policies such as
cutting charges or export taxes could limit production_ as we shall see below.
But important also are the questions, where logs are cut, which logs are cut,
and how they are cut. Since many of the effects of forestry activity involve
external benefits and costs, these various decisions--both quantitative and
*By economic rents we mean returns beyond what investments would yield
elsewhere, adjusted for risk
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qualitative--cannot be left solely to private market forces. Thus, in
addition to limiting concessions of forest land, and determining their
locetlon, the government must, of necessity, set rules and regulations
regarding their use. Price Interventionpollcles that operate through
marketincentlves can, however, reinforce (and, in turn, be reinforced by)
direct controls and regulations. Moreover, ••there can be institutional
arrangements surrounding the granting of concessions that would promote
complementarity between private and social interests.
The question, offoreignexchange earnings is also complex, involving
•the overall incentives to forest product exports, the choice between,.
exporting 10gs or processed wood products, and the optimum exploitation
of foreign demand. These will be given special attention in the analgsis
that follows.
i.
Direct Controls. This refers to limits on concessions and regulations
on cutting. We describe this graphically inFigure I simply as a
limitation on output at Q*, though we noted in the introduction that regu-
latlonsmust pertain to more than just the level of output. Domestic
demand (D)and supply (S) curves are shown; and we initially take world
price (Pw) as given. In the absence of price intervention policies •this
is also the domestic price. Domestic use is QD and exports are Q* - QD'
in contrast to the level QF - QD' which •would obtain without controls.
_ 1•$-
The results of•this policy can be .listedas follows:
I) The conservation goal is met, if the control on output is met
together with the qualitative goals.
2) Foreign exchange earnings are lower.
:3) Ifwe assume that S represents long-run supply price, includin8
necessary profits, •there are excess profits at the marSin of
production, equal to the distaac_, ac; and, in addition, there
are intra-marginal rents that are not captured for society.
4) There is uo government revenue.
5) Users are unaffected. There isno promotion of processing,
(The implicationsof this are considered below).
6) Since Pw is assumed to be given, the quest_ol_ of optimum exploi-
tation of world demand does not arise.
p
S'
Pw
Pa
V-- i/- -,x o
o qD Q* QF
Figure 1
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Cutting Charges. Fo_ simplicity it is assumed that various cutting
charges can be represented by e tax per t_ait of output of cut logs. This
is represented in Figure i as a shift in the supply curve from S co S_.
The world, price, Pw, is again taken as given and there are direct controls
to meet the qualitative conservation goals.
Thus, a cutting charge, •represented by the distance, acp taken by
itself, would (if effective) constrain output to the desired conservation
level, Q*. The price (net of charge) to concessionaires is Pu"
The effects of a cutting charge differ from those of direct controls
in a number of i_0rtant ways, though in some respects they ere similar.
The principal differences are that there is government revenue equal to
PwacPn and that rent on marginal output is eliminated so that total
rent is reduced.
_. This is an ad valorem tax on exports and is represented
in Figure 2 (similar to Figure 1) by the difference between Pw (still taken
as given) and Pn (price net of export tax). We are assuming competition,
P
•,.d e .... a b_ s
'° -t I
"- T-'l- I I
• , ' I "DII 1 ' l• _ . _.. . |
o ............. qQD Q_ Qs Q* QF
Figure 2
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Figure.• 3
As above, in the analysis of ,the effects of an export tax, producers
lose (area PoabPd), government gains (area PwcdPd), and users gain (area
PoefPd). But in this case the tax is not .adistortion but a correction
of a distortion -~ the gap between Pd and MRw that would exist in the
absence of the optimum export tax. For the opportunity cost of domestic
use of logs is MRwp not world price. While users gain, this means that
they no-longer have to pay for logs in excess Of their opportunity cost,
Hence, a bias against processing is removed.
The fact that producers lose is immaterial if other policies are
properly in place -- cutting charges plus•direct controls torestrlct
output•to the desired level and achieve other conservation goals•,plus
• a
some means of capturing intramarginal rents (for this,, see below).•
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The price producers receive represents the real social value of their
export sales.
' The above analysis has implicit assumptions that exporters are
atomistic competitors, taking world price •as given; and that there is no
retaliation from the world. How much monopoly power the Philippines
has in world log trade is an open question° What is relevant is the
long-run elastlclty of demand, which may be very high.
Capturing Intra_arginal Rents. None of the policies analyzed above
is able to capture the private, intramarginal rents from use of public
forest land. What is desired,• in addition to meeting the other goals
included in the analysis, is to limit profits to those just necessary to
attract the capital and entrepreneurship needed for the target level of
output. Since the long-run supply prlceof output of logs is bound to be
upward-sloping, the most than can be accomplished by price intervention
policies, like cutting charges and an export tax, is the elimination of
excess profit (rent) at the margin, leaving intr--_rginal rents intact.
This is not easy to accomplish_ .Competitive bidding for concession
leases would tend to eliminate anticipated excess-profits, but thisuay
have little to do with realized returns over _he llfe of a lease, which
should be considerably longer than the roughly 60-year maturation period for
.some hardwood species. Alternatively, the government Could;auction the
rights for cutting in specified areas; or, to be sure of effective compe-
tition, hire the cutting and transport of logs to a market for competitive
bidding (Howe, 1979, p. 234). But this w)uld mean government emnagement
,t
of the forests, which might present some legal, to say nothing of
administrative, problems. (It should be noted, however, that recently
a number of li.censes have been revoked " for violations. This could
present an opportunity for government experiments along these lines).
Given the present system of licensing, the property tax on forest
land would seem to be a logical instrument for capturing economic rents
from the licensees. It has two disadvantages, however. First_ if its is
based on the value of the timber stand, it might tend to shorten the
cutting cycle (Howe, 1979, p. 231). Second, an annual tax presents a
financial problem for new and young forests; hence, it might discourage
planting
Promoting Processing. The promotion •of the processing Of logs is
needed because of the bias against it •that comes from. t.he industrial
protection system (Power, 1979). Virtually all wood products are
exportable and most are already being exported. The industrial protection
system in the •Philippines favors industries that sell only in the domestic
market over exports by a very substantialmargin. Just to overcome the
undervaluation of foreign exchange that the protection system defends
would require an export subsidy of 20 to 30 percent (Medalla, 1980).
A direct subsidy of this order of magnitude to the export of pro-
cessed wood products would be the ideal remedy (assuming infinitely
elastic world de,m_nd for these exports). An export tax on logs beyond the
optimum described above could also be used as a means of promoting pro-
cessing, but this would be definitely second •best. The same is tr_e of a
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quota or ban. The price of logs would be put below its social opportunity
cost. Moreover, an export tax or a quota has an output limitation effect
which would only by accident meet the conservation target. It is impossi-
ble for one instrument (export tax or qu_,ta) to achieve three targets
(optimum output limitation, optimum export, and optimum promotion of pro-
cessing).
0primal Set of Policies. Given the number of different goals, it
is likely that an equal number of different policies in combination would
represent an optimal set. What would these be7
First, to capture private rents, government management with competi-
tive private biddin& for logs should be established. An alternative would
I
be a system of land taxes.
Second, an export tax should be set which, together with the implicit
tax on exports from the protection system, would achieve the optimum export
level. Given likely estimates of world demand elasticity and the high
existing rate of implicit tax on exports, the optimal policy might actually
be to subsidize log exports. That is, the implicit tax from industrial
protection might exceed the optimal export tax. Processed wood products
would receive an even higher rate of subsidy, since they are subject to the
same implicit tax and, presumably, have high&z.world demand elasticities.
The output limitation target and other conservation goals should be
met via direct controls and cutting charges. The latter, together with
the export tax would yield government revenue for forest administration,
To set a target for such revenue other than this determined amounts of
revenue would require another policy instrument -- e.g., general taxation.
Promotion of processing as noted above should be achieved through
a direct subsidy, designed to overcome the in,licit tax from the protection
system.
In sum, in an ideal set of policies there would be four policy ins-
instruments to meet four major goals:
I) Conservation: forest charges combined with direct controls.
2) Income distribution (capturing of private rents); competitive
bidding for logs.
3) Foreign exchange earnings consistent w_th comparative advantage:
export taxes and subsidies.
4) Revenue for forest administration: general taxation to make up
any shortfall from forest charges plus export taxes minus subsidies.
Note that cutting charges are combined with an export tax) and this
is.illustra_ed in Figure 3 _bove) where S_ is above S by the cutting
charges per unit of output that would achieve Q*, the desired level of
output for conservation. (In the unllkely event that Q* > q cutting sub-
sidles would be required.) While the cutting charges, together with
direct controls, serves the conservation goal, the role of the export tax
is limited to creating the appropriate wedge between world and domestic
prices -- now r_ and P_.
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Existing Policies and SecOnd-Best Reform. The above represents a
..
first-best approach to an optimal set of forestry policies. How would
we judge present policies in the light af these same consideration?
Whatmight be done to improve present policies_s_ ° as to move closer to
the optimal set?
At present, there are direct controls, cutting charges, export
taxes on logs and some processed products, qoutas on log exports, subsl-
dies on some exports of processed products, and sales taxes on domestic ,
sales of processed products. There is a land tax on forest conceeeions_
but no system of bidding for 3ogs. Hence_ aside from the last, all of
the instruments discussed above are currently in use. Again, with this
one exception, the important questions are mainly the rates of charges,
taxes and subsidies and their combination.
First, however, let us consider quotas on log exports, which are
considered to be an interim policy until the industry is ready for the
projected complete ban. Quotas have the effects of limiting production,
raising world price, and depressing domestic price to encourage pro-
cessing. Moreover, since the granting of quotas is tied to the integra-
tion of processing with logging, there is an additional incentive to
processing. The latter, however, encourages processing to gain the
benefit of a quota allotment, rather than primarily to earn profits
through economical and efficient processing. This tie-in can, then be
dismissed as an inept end , perhaps, costly means of encouraging processing.
_t
Beyond that, the quota system is revealed as inferior to direct controls
• I
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and cuttin 8 charges as a means of lindtin S output, and as inferior to an
export tax as a means of exploiting fore_.gn demand. These alternative
policies have the important advantage of contributing revenue to the
government to reduce the amount required from general taxation to finance
forest administration.
A complete ban has the same weakness in more acute form. It raises
no revenue and only by accident would it accomplish the right output
limitation, or the right degree of exploitation of foreign demand, or the
right subsidy to processing. The best that could be said for it is that
it would reinforce other policies deslgnedto limit cutting of trees.
How well it could do this depends on how effectively it is administered.
The present widespread evasion of quota limitations does not promise
much in this respect. Moreover, it is difficult to safeguard against
corruption in the administration of a quota system.
Direct controls includglimiting (and locating) concessions, together
with rules and regulation about forestry practices. These together with
cutting charges could serve to limit output and promote conservation goals.
Cutting charges also help to reduce rents and contribute revenue to the
government. There appears to be widespread feeling that the administration
of controls in the past has not beeen effective in meeting the conservation
goal_ Moreover, the cutting charges have become so low in real terms that
they cannot serve effectively to reinforce conservation goals or to raise a
significant amount of revenue. The weakness of administration of direct
controls to achieve conservation targets is perhaps what lies behind the
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urge to adopt such.a crude po!icy as a ban on log. exports. The Latter,
however, is no substitute for strengthening administration and raising
cutting charges.
As noted above, the export tax on logs, along with similar taxes
on other major exports, was instituted in 1970 as a so-called stabiliza-
tion measure to accompany the floating of the peso and its subsequent
depreciation. Originally scheduled to be phased out, the export tax
system was continued apparently for the substantial government revenue it
produced.
It is not easy to provide a rationale for a tax on log exports
along these lines. Prior to the •floating of the pesoln 1970undervalua-
tion of foreign exchange from exchange rate disequilibrium tms taxing log
exports. With the floating of the peso an explicit export_axwas substi-
tuted. But why tax log exports in the first place? We have seen above
that the'only first best rationale for such a tax is the goal of optimum
exploitation of foreign demand. There is no evidence that the rate of
tax hasbeen set with this in ,dud. especially when we consider the heavy
implicit tax on all exports from the industrial, protection system, Second
best justifications would include promotion of processing and the capturing
of rents. Again, there is no evidence that the rate of tax has been cons-
clously set so as to achieve an optimal subsidy to processing. And, as
we have seen above, an export tax cannot capture inttamarginal rents, while
at the same i.t is inferior to.cutting charges in raising revenue.
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Nevertheless. in the absence of first-best direct subsidies to pro-
cessing and some means of eliminating rents, am export tax can serve as
a general second-best measure for capturing some.,,rents, providing .some
subsidy to processing and raisins some revenue.
Subsidies to exports of processed wood products have been awarded in
aome instances through BOI incentives (a_ example is furniture). How-
ever, these subsidies have not been general and fall far short of what is
needed to overcome the general bias against exporting. (As we have noted
above, the bias against processing in the forestry industry comes from
the bias against exporting, since virtually all processed wood products
are export products.) With the projected gradual reform of tariff pro-
tection the bias will diminish, but not disappear, over the next four oz
five years. The first-best solution would be to subsidize processed
wood exports at the estimated rate of undervaluation of foreign exchange
that is defended by the protection system. But the same argument applies
to all exports, and to extend the principle to exports generally would
call for a massive fiscal program. That is why, of course, a continuing
liberalization of tariff protection beyond the projected first phase is
so essential.
What is ironic in this picture, ho,_ever, is the existence of export
taxes on processed wood products: lumber and veneer.*
It is not easy to believe that world demand elasticities could justify
these on top of the general penalty on exports. An accurate assessment
,i
would probably call for some subsidy, instead to offset the latter. But
*There is no export tax on plywood at present.
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a second-beat approach to improvesmnt of forest industry policies vould
at least include re:oval of these export taxes.
What the above economic analysis of forestry policies suuests is
that if the goverrment is unnble or unvilling to move at once to the
opti_al set of policies, first steps in the reform of the present system
would include:
1) Removal of export taxes on.lumber and veneer;
2) Substantially increased cutting charges;
3) Continuation of an export tax on logs without export quotas
or threat of a ban; and
4) Strengthened control over forest administration.
4. Research MethOdology.
The principal tasks of the study are to assess the comparative
advancaKe of forestry activities, including processing, to evaluate the
effects of government policies on these act_vities, and to preunt a
critique of government policies inthe light of the findings. The first
two tasks represent the positive aspects o£ the study, and the methods
and procedures followed in carrying them out represent the subject of
this section,
In an ideal world of perfect markets and perfect information market
prices could be expected to reflect social costs and values, subject to
imporcant qualifications where externalities* are present. In the real
*"Externalities" are elements of value that the market cannot capture.
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world, however, market prices do not _ecessarily reflect social opportunity
costs_because of the presence of market distortions or imperfections due
to taxes, subsidies, price controls_ trade restrtctions,.andmonopoly
power, as well as externalities. In such cases, social opportunity costs.
or shadow prices, can diverge from market prices.
Particular attention is given in this study to price distortions
from government policies, which can represent _ncentives or d_sincentives
to producers. We attempt to measure these as the nominal and effective
protection rates (NPR and EPR) accorded the various activities, which can
be either positive or negative.
To assess comparative advantage, we estimate the social opportunity
cost of using domestic resources to earn or save foreign exchange --
commonly called "domestic resource coat" (DRC). Border prices, which ere
world prices at the domestic port (FOB for exports, CIP for imports), are
used in price comparisons to represent the opportunity costs of interna-
tionally traded goods in both DRC and protection rate estimates.
Nominal Protection Rate (.NPR). This is thapEopottiQnal difference
between the domestic and border prices of a product. This difference or
"wedge", may be created by tariffs, discriminating sales taxes, quotas,
or other price interventions policies.
d
pj -
srRj
J
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where: pO. is domestic price of commodity j
J
Pb is border price of j expressed in pesos at the official
J
exchange rate.
Effective Protection Rate (EPR). This measure of protection takes
into account protection accorded to inputs, as well as outputs, of a
particular activity. Thus, it measures protection of value added.
Vd
EPR = _- I
vb
where Vd is value added at domestic (protected) prices.and Vb is value
added at border prices (in domestic currency at the official exchange
rate). No new estimates of EPRs were unddrtaken in this study, but
previous estimates (Bautista, et.al., 1979) are reviewed in connection
with the discussion of government policies.
Domestic Prices. To be comparable to border prices, domestic
prices must be measured at the same point in the marketing chain. More-
over, price comparisons are directly meaningful only for identical
quality. Manila wholesale prices represent the most readily available
data. Since most logging firms are near their own regional ports,
where shipments both to Manila and to the world originate, an adjustment-
for transport to Ranila is required. Moreover, it is widely beI_eved
m
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that exported logs are of superior quality, Hence, a quality adjustment
is alsorequired.
Rather r.han attempt to estimate these adju_ments separately, a
combined adjustment for both was estimated by co_paring wholesale prices
and export unit value during the period 1956-69 when there were no
export taxes or quotas. This suggested a 14.5 per cent downward adjust-
ment of the Manila wholesale price to account for quality differences
and transport costs from the regional port to l_anila. Applyln s this
adjustment to the price relationship in the lgTOs enabled us to estate
the effects of export taxes and quotas on the nominal protection rate.
AnOther _odification is necessary because of the quotas, which
began in 1974. With an effective quota on exports, the doRestic price
will be belov the export price, net of tax. To get the nominal protect-
ion rate, we really want the price to the producer, which is a weighe6d
average of the domestic price and the net export price.
Pd D  Fb(l-e) X
p -
D+Z
where P is the producer price.
D is domestic sales volume.
X is export volume.
e is rate of export tax.
The:_ P was substituted for pd in the formula.for _R.
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Domestic Resource Cost (DRC), _ds is_ in effect, the "own"
exchange rate for an activity -- the rate at which it can convert domestic
resources measured in peso social values into foreign exchange either
by exporting or substituting for imports.
g + Cd + Ld + Nd
DRC =
pbq _ (Cf + N_)
Where: R is lend rent (social value)
C is user cost of capgtal (social value)
L is labor cost (social value)
N is cost of intermediate in?uts
pbQ is value of output at border price
and the subscripts_
d and f_ refer to domestic znd foreign origin, Foreign costs
and border prices are in terms of foreign exchange.
DRCs have previously been estimated for the major forest
products_ using data from the 1969 and 1976 input-output tables (Bautlst&,
et.al., 1979). This study supplMents this with DRC estimates based on
1977-79 data from a sample of six logging and wood processing firms. New
estimates for 1974 were also made on the basis of input-output data and
the capital structure of the sample firms, Social values for the primary
inputs_ land_ labor and capitalp were estimated as explained below.
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SOcial Value, of Land. Normally we would take as the opportunity
cost of land in forest its value in the best alternative usa, which
might be marginal upland crop farming. The question is complicated,
howevert by the imp0rtantsocial benefits that accrue from keeping land in
forest, including benefits to crop farming in general. Given.the wide-
spread concern over the extent to which fores_ have already disappeared
in the recent past, it might be judged that the external benefits (quite
apart from the value Of woodproducts) from a marginal hectare in forest
would, in the present situation, be at least equal to its direct value in
crop farming.
Following our assumption of reasonably well-managed sustained yield
forestry, the question comes down to how much land should be in forest.
As forest land expanded we could expect the external benefits at the
margin to diminish and the opportunity cost in the form of the land's
value in other uses to increase. Expressing the social value of land as
an annual rent, this value would represent the difference at the margin
between the opportunity cost and the external benefits.
If, as above, we would judge that st the present allocation of
land to forestp the marginal benefits exceed the cost_ the rent would be,
at most, zero. We take zero, then as the lower limit.
For comparison, and to test the sensitivity of our DRC estimates
to the social value of land, we somewhat arbitrarily assume an upper
limit of _600 per hectare to represent the rental value in marginal up-
land crop farming. Again, somewhat arbitrarily, we apply this to She-half
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of the total area of the concession on what we think is a conservative
assumption that, no more than that proportion is likely to qualify as
suitable for crops.
The above method applies to the DRC estima'tes for the sample flrms.
For the input-output data estimates,, we include rent in a residual after
deducting capital cost from "other value added" in the 1974 table.
Social Value of Labor. Most logging operations are integrated
with wood processing and firms are subject to minimum wage legislation.
It has been estimated (Medalla, 1979) that the social'opportunity cost
c_unskilled labor was about 80 per cent ¢f the minimum wage (including
allowances in the late 1970s). A study of the wage data of the six
firms indicated that unskilled labor was receiving at least the minimum
wage (plus allowances). Hence the 'bhadow pricd' of labor was put at
80 per cent of reported cost.
Social Value of Capital. The user cost of capital consists of
interest and depreciation costs. The estimate of these requires e prior
estimate of the replacement cost of capital, a social (or shadow)
interest rate, and an estimated rate of depreciation. Replacement cost
of capital was determined by adjusting the original reported acquisition
cost for the rate of inflation in capital goods prices over the age of
the equipment. Depreciation was estimated by the straight-line method on
an estimated life of the capital goods. For the latter, the reported
values were adjusted upward to take into account the fact that equipment
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Table 5. A/location ratios used in estimating DRC using
established data.
COST OF INPUT : DOMESTIC " : FOREIGN
Interest _ost 95 5
Depreciation:
Building & Structure I/ 100 0
Production machinery and
equipment _/ 5 95
Transport equipment _/ I0 90
Other fixed assets _ / 85 15
Labor 'I00 0
Glue .0 I00
Fuel and lubricants 0 i00
Land 100 0
i/ This is based on theimport content of the "general building
-- Construction" sector in the 1969 & 1974 input-output
tables which is less than 2Z.
_/ In the IPPP, the ratio is 0-i00 but this •study used a 5-95
ratio based on the import content •of "special industry
machinery" sector in the 1974 input-outputtable which
is 96%.
3--/ IPPP Project Technical Note No. 4 determined this as the
ratio of domestic value added to total cost• in the
transport equipment manufacturing sector.
4/ Consists of items like office furniture and equipment not
directly used in the productionprocess. It has been
estimated in the IPPP that 15Z of the value of such goods
come from foreign sources,
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a few firms •areactually engaged in the utilization of logging wastes
and mill residues.
.Sampling and Data Collection. Datawere gathered from six fi-rms
which were the only acceptable respondents from an initial list of 30
firms obtained from the Presidential Committee on.Wood Industries.Develop-
ment (PCWID) Directory of Timber Licenses in the Philippines (1980).
Table 6 gives _he employment level and product lines of the six firms.
The survey questionaires were mailed in the first week of January 1981
to the selected firms and the data were personally collected from the
firms from May to July of tbe same year.
Table 6. Employment level and product lines of the six
sample firms, 1977-1979.
SAMPLE : TOTAL : .PRODUCT LINES AND.Z SHARE TO TOTAL
FIRM EMPLOYMENT VALUEOF THE FIRM's OUTPUT
Log : •Lumber : 'Plywo_du,
F1 1345 23 4 73
F2 1658 0 100 O
F3 708 68 5 27
F4 2659 67 29 4
F5 3215 22 24 54
F6 2352 21 18 61
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5. Protection and Comparative Advantage: the Empirical Evidence.
Protection: Logs. As explained i_ Section 4 (above) it is
assumed that prior to 1970, when there was no export tax or quota,
quality adjusted regionaldomestic price was equal to export unit value,
which represents border price. The nominal protection rate, in other
words, was zero. There may have been exceptions to this generalization
-- for example, during 1962-1965 when the so-called "retention scheme"
penalized major exports via a less favorable exchange rate. The focus
here, however, is on the major interventions in the 1970s in the form
of export taxes and quotas.
Table 7 shows estimates of the NPR for logs, based on price com-
parisons, for 1970-80. The average rate for the years 1970-75 was minuc
6 per cent_ reflecting the export tax and the sliding scale
premium that was In effect for a limited period after 1973.* The
rate varied sharply from year to year, as we have measured it , but
this is to be expected when international prices or the exchange rate
change suddenly as they did in 1970 and 1973. There is a lag in adjust-
ment of domestic prices which exaggerates the wedge temporarily. Overall
for the period, however, the price comparison yields a result close
enough to what we would expect from the export tax plus premium to
justify confidence in our adjustment for quality and transport costs.
Quotas began in 1974, but their effect was negligible until more
stringent limits were imposed in 1976. The period 1976-78 shows, an
*The export tax on logs has recently been raised to 20 per cent.
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Table7. Nominal Protection Rate for Logs, 1970-1980
Year : Adjusted Domestic Price I/ :• -- Border Price } Nominal Protection_2/
: (_ per cu. meter) : (_ per cu. meter) _ Rate (per cent)
-- - = - ,L - ' ....
1970 128 150 -15
1971 161 165 -02
1972 170 157 +08
1973 215 270 -20
1974 303 311 -03
1975 260 267 _03
1976 297 441 -33
1977 368 490 -25
1978 390 490 -20
1979 470 946 -50
1980 578 990 -42
Average (unweighted):
1970-75 -06
1976-78 -26
1979-80 -46
I/ Manila wholesale price divided by 1.17 for combined quality
and transport cost adjustment, as explained in Section 4.
2/ Domestic Prices
- I i00 for 1970-1973.
Border Price
We£ghted Average of Domestic and Net Export Price
- 1 "100 for 1974-I
Border P':ice
a B nk
Philippine Forestry Statistic, 1976 and 1980.
World Bank, "Price Prospects £orHajor Primary Commodities" 1980,
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penalty on the price of output. For logs, this additional penalty is
negligible, so that the EPR is roughly equal to the NPR. For 1974, the
IPPP Project set both NPR and EPR at minus 10 per cent, the rate of export
taX.
For lumber, the IPPP Project estimated an EPR of 16 per cent --
positive protection overall because the depressed price of logs as the
major input more thatn offset the paenalty of the export tax on output.
Plywood and Venerate combined in the input-output table; hence,
the Project estimated a combined EPR for these products at five per cent
-- again positive because of the greater export tax on the principal input,
logs.
Finally, it should be inoted that these effective rates of protection.
are calculated at the existing exchange rate, which in the 1970s was esti-
mated to undervalue foreign exchange anywhere from 14 to 24 per cent
because of the trade restrictive effect of the eutlre industrial protect-
ion.system (Sautista, et. el., 1979). All exports, then were penalised to
this extent as compared to ehac they would earn under free trade or, alter-
natively, under what the IPPP Project called an"optimal intervention
system". In this project we are using a sliKhtly narrower range of 17 to
23 per cent for the estimate of the undervaluation of foreign exchange
(equivalent to a 20 to 30 per cent overvalua_ion of the peso). Adjusting
for this we get ranges of net effective protection rates for the major
wood products of:
Logging -31 to -25 per cent
Lumber 'll to 3 per cent
Plywood b -19 to -12 per cent
Veneer.
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These are measures of the total penalty from export taxes and
industrial protection •(mainly in the fom of tariffs). This does not
take into account the effect of quotas•on log exports, whichwouldmake
the total penalty on logs much greater.
Comparative Advantage: Domestic Resource costs. Two separate
sets of estimates of DRCs were made. The first was•based on data from
the input-output table for 1974. The second was based on data from our
survey of six firms. The method of estimation was explained above in
Section4. The results for the first set are as follows:
Logging 5.47
Lumber. 6.20
Plywood & Veneer 6.04
These figures represent in pesos the estimated social costs of earning
one dollar through production for export. To assess comparatlve advantage
we need to compare them with the shadow price of forelgnexchange. The
latter was estimated according to the method of the lPPP Project to be in
a range of 20 to 30 per cent above the official rate during the mlddle s_
late 1970s. This gives a range of 8.15 to 8,83 for the shadow exchange
rate in 1974. £t is evident, then, that these DEC results indicate strong
potential comparative advantage. It must be stressed that this advanta? _
is potentlal only on the assumption of reasonable well managed sustained
yield forestry, We believe that past practices of virtually mining the
fore stswould incur such high social costs as to result in very unfavorabi_
DZCs.
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Turning to the DRC estimates for the sample firms it should be
noted that all were integrated in that they combined logging _th soma
lumber and/or plywood production. Each had a definite concentrations
however, in terms of value of final product. These concentrations are
indicated in the table below, which gives DRC estimates for 1977 -1979
on the alternative assumptions of zero rent and _600 per hectare.
FIRM DRC
ZeroRent r6OO_n_
.I, Plywood 5.78 10.73
2. Lumber 6.89 8.97
3. Logging 4.49 13,64
4. Logging 3.42 4.84
5. Plywood 4.73 7.14
6. Plywood 5..55 7.35
With two exceptions, these D_C estimates fall below the shadow
exchange rate for 1977-79, which is in the range, 8.86 to 9.59. The
two exceptions for firms I and 3, showed much greater:sensitivity to a
variation in l_d rent, the reason being that they had much ithe lowes_
ratios of hectares actually logged to total hectares _nthe concession.
Correspondingly, they had by far the lowestvaluee of output per con-
cession hectare. Sine_concession hectares simply measure space, it is
possible thatfor these two the proportion of concession space that was
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usable.forest was lower. Hence_ our rent estimates would be relatively
too high for them. Alternatively, they may have been operating at below
optimum levels of logglng and output. Among the six there was a perfect
negative rank correlation between size of operatlon_ indicated by value
of output, and DRC, with rent at _600. But the rent factor was not
decisive, since the correlation was very high with zero rent.
In any case, we think that the zero rent assumption comes closer
to reflecting the present situation, as we indicated above. This implies
again a very strong showing of potential comparative •advantage for these
six wood product firms. While the sample is too small to provide a basis
for strong conclusions, the results are reasonably consistent with those
from the aKEregated input-output data. We have no direct evidence on the
forest management practices of these firms. It is possible that to meet
the standards of our assumption of sustained yleld forestry, the firms
mlght hereto _ncur additional costs.
It is int_estlng to compare these results wlthlPPPProjeet estimates
for wood and paper products for•the years 1969 and 19_4, as shown in
Table 8, together with their estimates of the shadow exchange rate for
the two years (Bautista, et. al., 1979).
- 45a -
Table 8. DRC Estimates _/for Wood and Paper Products Industries 1969-1974
: DRC ESTIMATE
INDUSTRY
1969 1974
Lumber 3.68 6.14
Plywood and veneer 4,65 6.48
Pulp, paper and paper manufacturing 6.04 9.14
Paper products 6.04 II.i0
Paper and paperboard containers 6.36 II,47
Shadow exchange rate 6.48 9.21
i/ As determined in the IPPP Project, 1979.
Again the potential comparative advantage of wood products is clear a_
stands out in relation to less advantage or comparative disadvantage for
paper products.
6. Spmm_ry and Conclusion.
The importance of efficient management of forest resources is well
appreciated in the Philippines. The government has shown an increasing
interest not only in the conservation of forests, but also in the econo-
mic benefits to be gained from forest products. Increasing attention
has been given recently to the forest communities in an effort to end
their destructive activities and find for them a more constructive role.
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This study has notattempted to evaluate the whole range of govern-
ment policies affecting forestry, but rather has concentrated on those
that most strongly affect the price incentives for productlonD processing
and export of forest products. Conservation goals have been taken as
given and technical questions of efficient forest management have been
left aside. The focus instead has been on broader aspects of economic
efficiency.
Principally, two questions were studied. First, does the Philip-
_ines have a comparatlve advantage in forest products.? Is it in the
interest of efficient utilization of Philippine resources to promote the
growth of the forest product industry? Subsidiary to this question is,
of course, the very important issue of the choice between exporting
primary or processed wood products. Second, how have government price
intervention policies affected the development of the forest product
industry? Have these policies been helpful or detrimental to the economic
use of forest resources to meet the development goals of the Philippines?
Here we have considered not only policies specifically directed to forest
products, but also the indirect, but powerful, effects on price incentives
from the industrial protection system.
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.What we have found? With respect to the first question, our esti-
mates -of DRCs both from input-output table data and from more detailed
survey data indicate strong potential comparative advantage in all three
major wood product activities -- logging, lumber,and plywood veneer if the
goal of sustained yield forestry can be met. A common measure of the
degree of comparative advantage is the ratio of the DEC to the shadow
exchange rate (SEE). A value less than one indicates comparative advantage
and the lower the value the greater is the degree of comparative advantage.
Ratios for our estimated DRCs, assuming zero land rent, range from .37
to .71 indicating a very substantial margin within which prices and costs
could vary wlthout sacrificing the Philippines comparative advantage
in wood products.
The DRC results depend, of course, on the particular levels of
prices and costs that prevailed during the period towhich the data •
belong -- for the survey, 1977-79. Moreover, the results depend also on
the assumptions about the shadow prices of land, labor and capital, as well
as on our heroic assumption about future forest management.
Table 8 shows elasticity coefficients to indicate the sensitivity of the
DRC estimates to Variations in costs and value of output. Again, we
assume zero land rent -- in effect, Judging that in the present situation
marglnal external benefits compensate for opportunity cost at the margin
of land in forest.
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about 40 per cent without pushing DRCs above the shadow exchange rate --
i.e., .without losing their comperative advantage,
• One might be tempted to compare the DRCs for logging with those
for the processed products to throw light on the question whether it is
better for the Philippines _to export logs or lumber and plywood, .The
•survey results, as well as those from input-output data, seem to suggest
a stronger comparative advantage in logging, It would be a mistake, how-
ever, to interpret this as favoring log export over export of lumber and
plywood. The rate of logging activity is dictated mainly by conservation
policy. Therefore, logging cannot expand beyond that by drawing resources
sway from lumber and plywood manufacture. Clearly logging is compara-
tively advantageous and should be pursued within the limits of conserva-
tio_ policy. The remaining question is whether labor and capital should
be applied to processing logs or to some other economic activity --e.g.,
automobile assembly or steelNaking. In other words, because of the con-
servation policy, logging and wood processing are not in competition with
each other for the use of resources. Rather, wood processing competes
with other, non-forest activities. In this _espectl the answer is clear,
The very favorable DRC-SER ratio's strongly indicate a comparative advan-
tagr for wood processing as compared to the average for manufacturing in
general. So it is better to export processed wood to gain the advantage
from both logging and processing.
We turn now to price intervention policies. In Section 3 (above)
we set four major goals for policy:
- 50 -
1) limit in S output to meet the conservation target,
. 2) capturing private rents from logging concessions,
3) promoting foreign exchange earnings consistent with comparative
advantage, and
4) raising revenue for forest administration.
We noted that no single policy (e.g., export tax or forest charge) can be
expected to attain all four goals. Indeed, cons_tent with the widely
accepted theory of economic policy, we concluded that we need four
separate policies (or sets of policies) to meet four goals.
Taking the last one (revenue) first: we note only that forest
charges and export taxes cannot be designed primarily for this purpose
since they have other roles to play. What revenue they do raise can
contribute to the financing of forest administration, but revenues from
general taxation must be used to fill the gap between this need and the
revenues from strictly forest policies. (If the gap is negative , of
course, forest policy revenues would make a net contribution to general
revenues.) The point is simply that forest charges and export taxes
should not be designed to meet a specific revenue target for forest
adminis trat ion.
With respect to conservation, we noted that, because of externali-
ties and the need to meet qualitative, as well as quantitative, aspects
of the conservation target, direct controls and regulations are needed.
Forest charges, by themselves, could limit output (if they are effective),
but could not meet the qualitative requirements of conservation po!,icy.
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Nevertheless, forest charges could play a role in supplementing direct
controls. We noted above that forest charges have declined in real
terms over the period studied; and , even with the recent rise in rates,
represent only e very light tax on output of logs -- probably less than
six per cent ad valorem. Moreover, while a decade ago revenue from forest
charges roughly matched government expenditures on forestry, they now
represent only about one sixth of those expenditures. No doubt they
could be raised substantially without reducing incentives to output below
the conservation target.
If forest charges were, indeed, raised to the point where it is
just profitable at the margin to produce the conservatlon-determined out-
put of logs, marginal rents would be eliminated. This leaves intra-
marginal rents as a remaining problem. The ideal method of eliminating
them -- namely competitive bidding for timber .... is not presently
available. A higher land tax would be a possible substitute. Serious
_udy should be undertaken to determlnej firstj the extent of intramarginal
rents, i.e._ excess of returns to capital in logging concessions over the
normal rate of return in other activities (with due allowances for risk);
end second, a means of administering a land tax on forest concessions
that would largely capture such rents for society.
Finally, we turn to the area of policy where this study and the
findings are most relevant -- promoting optimal foreign exchange earnings
from forest products. Policies that have the greatest impact here are:
(I) the industrial protection system which penalizes all exDort& via
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undervaluing foreign exchange; (2) export taxes, quotas and subsidies.
We have already noted above, in the discussion of .comparative
advantage, that it is preferable to export lumber and plywood/veneer
rather than loss. Moreover, we noted the strong indicatlon of comparative
advantage in both producing logs and processing them for export. In
Section 3 (above) we noted also the advantage of creating a wedge
between world and domestic prices of logs that reflects world elasticity
of demand. In addition, we noted that an export tax is the ideal instru-
ment for this purpose, and that export quotas (or ban) represent an
inferior method. Finally, we noted that the protection system imposes a
penalty on all exports in the range of 17 to 23 per cent via undervaluation
of forelgn exchange. '.
Ideally, then, we would have a total export tax equal to 1/e,where e is
the estimated long-run world elasticity of demand for logs. By "total'*
we mean the combined effect of the penalty from undervaluation of foreign
exchange and the explicit export tax. Since the former is probably at
least _7 per cent, it seems very difficult to justify for this reason any
explicit export tax at all on logs. It is not likely, in other wordsl
that the •world demand elasticity for Philippine loss has an absolute
value less. than six.
It should be noted that the 17 to 23 per cent penalty on export
from undervaluation of foreign exchange is quite apart from any peso
overvaluation that results from disequilibrium in the foreign exchange
_arket. It is due solely to the distortions caused by industrial
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protection. If it is judged that the present value of the peso is not
an equilibrium one -- e.g., because of excessive forei_ borrowing --
this would represent an additional element of distortion in the value of
foreign exchange. This can be easily seen with _he aid o£ Figure 4.
Price of Foreign. Ex.change
.S
G --
/ / " D'
L
•Quantity of
Foreign Exchange
Figure 4
S and D represent the supplyanddemand.for foreign exehanse in
the absence of industrial protectionand with foreign borrowing at .a
level that is judged to be desirable, Industrial protection (in the
form of tariffs) reduces the demand for foreign exchange (by reduclng
.i
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imports) to D'. The price of foreign exchange £s reduced to F from its
•initial •equilibrium at E. If we add excessive foreign borrowings the
supply of foreign exchange is now S', reducing i_s price further to G.
The gap between E and C is the total undervaluation of foreign
exchange, made up of the "distortion gap," EFt and the "disequilibrium
gap," PG. What this suggests is that the 17 to A3 per cent estimate of
the distortion gap may represent a conservative estimate of the total
undervaluation of foreign exchange, in view of the government's desire
to reduce dependence on foreign borrowing.
There isj of course, a similar penalty on exports of lumber and
veneer. To correct this in a first-best manner, would require
the removal of the four per cent export tax on these products and its
replacement by a 20 per cent subsidy./(the latter also for plywood).
Thus the first -best package might be: (I) no quota or ban on
lo8 exports, (2) no export tax on logs, lumber or plywood/veneer, and
(3) a 20 per cent subsidy to processed wood exports, There is a tacit
assumption here, of course, that the implicit export tax on logs from
undervaluation of the currency is about right for the optimal exploita-
tion of foreign demand. The implied elasticity of world demand is
probably too low on a long-run view, however.
19 any case this £irst-best package has financial _nplications
that might be disturbing.. We must .consider that not only processed wood
products., but. all exports face the same penalty and_ in a sense, "deserve"
•the same subsidy. To.implement tha latter might imply an impossible tax
and transfer problem for the government.
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A second-best approach, then would be to continue the export tax
on logs both for revenue and as an instrument for promoting processing.
We saw above, in SectionS, that depressing the domestic price of logs
via an export tar could raise the effective protection of processed wood
products. Net .effective protection (i.e., net of the effect of under-
valuation of foreign exchange) was seen to be still negativep but elimi-
nating the four per cent export tax on lumber and plywood/veneer would
help to correct that.
Carrying this argument further, the second-best solution might be
an even higher export tax on logs to give adequate relief to the export
of processed wood products. There is some level for this which, together
with the re_val of the export tax on lumber and plywood/veneer, would
give the latter at least zero net effective protection. (If foreign
exchange is g_ven still greater value for balance of payments reasons --
i.e., to reduce foreign borro_r_ng_ the export tax on logs should be
higher again for this reason.) The fact that the tax on log exports puts
the net price to exporters below marginal revenue is of little con-
sequence if lo8 exports are to be phased out anyway in favor of processed
wood exports.
In sum, a second-best approach to policy reform would include at
least: (1) removal of export tax on processed wood products, (2)
increased forest charges, (3) perhaps an increase in the export tax on
logs, (4) elimination of quotas on logs exports, and (5) hopefully an
improved land tax on forest concessions.
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Finally, it w£i1 be recalled that in approaching the problem of
estimatingDRCs we made the assumption thatthe government would be.
•able in future to administer reasonably well an efficient sustained yield
system of forest management. This, of course, is the crucial element in
the forestry policy package.
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